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SPACE STATION FREEDOM 
SAFETY PROGRAM
John -G. Griggs, III
Chief, Safety Division
Space Station Freedom Program Office
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
ABSTRACT
This paper begins with a renewed 
safety consciousness within NASA. 
There is focused management 
emphasis on the incorporation of 
firmly established safety design 
requirements and evolving new 
Safety analysis techniques, 
including the quantitative safety 
risk assessment methods. We as an 
Agency must do our very best to 
preclude another accident.
Further discussed is the framework 
for the Space Station Freedom 
Safety Program. This framework 
provides for integration of the 
partial safety analysis performed 
by the numerous NASA Centers and 
the International Partners into a 
Programmatic Safety Assessment for 
each of the launch increments as 
well as the complete Space Station 
Freedom on orbit.
INTRODUCTION
The Space Station Freedom is on a 
course to effect the agreements 
necessary to implement, early on, 
a program-wide safety program. The 
safety program includes carefully 
reviewed and tailored requirements 
for a) design, and b) safety 
analysis efforts which can then be 
integrated to develop the 
programmatic risk assessment for 
the Program Director. Internally,
NASA has adopted new procedures for 
the traditional analyses efforts 
and incorporated new quantitative 
assessment methods on the Space 
Station Freedom Program. NASA is 
working with the International 
Partners to insure that their 
equivalent practice to our 
methodology, and the result, is 
acceptable and achievable.
The status of that work, and 
discussion of agreements still 
needed, are the focus of this 
report.
TEXT
History has documented that the 
NASA had fallen into the so- 
familiar pattern of "disregard of 
the situation" (just as you might 
with your power saw at home).
History has also shown that 
Reliability's Failure Modes And 
Effects Analysis (FMEA), as well as 
the various safety analyses which 
key from the FMEA as a starting 
point had become an historical 
record rather than analyses which 
drive design.
It is fair to say that over time 
the significance of the safety 
input to decisions concerning 
manned space flight diminished. 
This has been well documented in
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the various commission reports. 
I judge this in part because of the 
quality of the safety input to the 
decisions diminished and in part 
because of the management attention 
to the safety program. Jointly, 
hand- in-hand, the management 
attention and the quality of the 
safety program eroded until the 
safety effort was "silent" and the 
management recognition was absent.
We are springing vigorously off of 
this renewed intensity in the 
development of the SRM&QA program 
for the Space Station Freedom 
Program. Not to diminish the 
efforts of those involved in the 
resumption of the manned space 
flight on the shuttle program, we 
on the Space Station Freedom have 
the opportunity (the obligation) to 
build a program which will not 
require revamping in the late 
1990's.
We in the NASA have now taken steps 
to insure that the FMEA and the 
safety analysis will be in the 
correct time frame relative to the 
design milestones, and will impact 
that design.
For the NSTS program, the FMEA and 
safety analyses have been re- 
accomplished, and many design 
changes have resulted. Further, 
where a safety risk has been 
accepted, it has been done in a 
systematic manner, with the Program 
D i rector mak1ng know1edgeab1e 
decisions.
NASA has also revisited the 
techniques for performing these 
safety analyses, and has linked 
them in a manner which will improve 
the result in the future. The 
Preliminary Hazards Analyses fed 
into the detailed Subsystem Hazards 
Analyses,. - and these, with 
unresolved hazards, carry into the
Operating Hazards Analyses which 
consider the operator and other 
environment factors.
The NASA is now incorporating a 
more rigorous analysis methodology. 
Quantitative analysis techniques 
developed in the chemical and 
nuclear industries are being 
evaluated and applied now to some 
efforts.
On the Space Station Freedom 
Program we are defining and 
implementing a safety program which 
will insure the safe launch, 
assembly, and 30 year operation of 
a manned base, and unmanned free 
flying platforms. The safety 
program includes requirements for 
a) design, and b) analysis of the 
evolving design for hazards. A 
part of the analysis is the 
identification of "hazard control 
requirements" which in the early 
program phases are derived design 
requirements.
We have in place today the initial 
set of safety design requirements, 
documented in the Program 
Definition and Requirements 
Document (PDRD). We further have 
defined an updated and workable 
process for performing the 
traditional qualitative safety 
analyses. The NASA level III 
Centers have agreed to use a common 
process and format for the analysis 
and the worksheet as we 1 I as the 
formal report.
We are now in the process of 
providing a program-wide electronic 
data base which will make the 
hazard data available to all who 
may be affected, and allows for 
feedback by the affected party. 
This assists in the severity 
categorization and development of 
hazard control requirements.
7-46
Within the NASA this data base will 
reside in .the Technical and 
Management Information System 
(TMIS) which is a SSF program-wide 
host system for data bases.
The next advancement, now in work, 
will be to incorporate the 
Quantitative J?isk Assessment (QRA) 
analysis process. The goal is to 
implement the QRA process in a 
manner which uses the FMEA and the 
qualitative hazards analyses as the 
input, and extends these WHERE 
REQUIRED into more in-depth 
analyses.
This is an advancement over the 
qualitative hazard analysis in 
several ways. First, it is more 
rigorous in the "What can go 
wrong?" portion of the qualitative 
analysis. This leads to a more 
complete hazard analysis, should 
the process be allowed to stop 
there.
The next step is to determine the 
likelihood of the occurrence. This 
is done in a detailed manner by the 
construction of a fault tree 
composed of the events which can 
lead up to the occurrence of the 
undesi red event descr i bed i n the 
scenario. The fault tree is first 
built in a qualitative manner, 
describing the combinations of 
events which could cause the 
Hazard.
The additional benefit is that the 
undes i red events can now be 
attached with a likelihood of 
occurrence, which we did before 
(but now with the application of 
statistical confidence limits). 
The overall fault tree can then be 
"summed" giving the hazard scenario 
a likelihood of occurrence (with 
confidence limits) and a damage 
estimate ($).
The damage estimate is "simply" the
estimated loss should the hazard 
occur in one of the manifestation 
modes which is possible. Since we 
seldom know that value, the 
application of statistical 
confidence limits is appropriate.
A risk function, be it a simple 
multiplication of the three 
factors, or some more complex 
function, can be used to establish 
a safety risk assessment.
Development of the criteria to 
determine when the additional, more 
rigorous analysis is required is 
under way and should be completed 
during the first quarter of 1989. 
It seems clear that at a minimum, 
any residual risk which is 
categorized as catastrophic 
requires this additional knowledge 
of causal factors, probability of 
occurrence, and definition of 
damage states.
As with the standard methodology 
for the qualitative safety hazards 
analyses, the QRA analytical method 
will be standard across the NASA 
portion of the Space Station 
Freedom program. This technique, 
too, will utilize the TMIS system 
for housing a master data base with 
the QRA models and fault tree 
analyses. The QRA model data base 
will link to the engineering data 
base for FMEA data, thereby 
Insuring the accuracy of the data, 
and use of common data.
This brings the discussion to the 
International Partners and how they 
will interface with or use these 
processes.
The U.S. NASA commitment to the 
Space Station Freedom Program is to 
build the core station, and to 
perform the integration of the 
portions built by the International 
Partners. The NASA core station 
involves the efforts of six NASA
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Centers, building the electrical 
power system, the habitant module 
and the U.S. laboratory module, as 
well as the truss assembly and the 
logistics module for servicing and 
crew re-supply.
These centers have agreed to use 
the safety analysis processes 
described above.
The three International Partners, 
each charged with building a 
significant element of the space 
station, currently have their own 
engineering and management systems. 
These include the European Space 
Agency, who builds the ESA attached 
laboratory module; the Japanese 
Space Agency, who also builds an 
experiment laboratory, an outside 
space exposure deck, and the remote 
manipulator arm to service the 
experiments; and Canada, who is 
responsible for the mobile 
servicing system. This system 
includes the remote manipulator 
capability designed to assemble the 
space station during the assembly 
stages.
Clearly, the International Partner 
elements are critical to the manned 
life support, and in the case of 
Canada, to the assembly of Space 
Station Freedom itself.
By Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU), the International Partners 
agree to "meet or exceed" the 
requirements the NASA applies to 
the U.S. portion of the space 
station. In the safety arena, this 
is true of both the design 
requirements and the analysis 
requirements for identifying and 
mitigating hazards.
Below the level of the MOU, the 
actual workings of the safety 
program between all partners can 
only be insured by the use of 
common (or equivalent) design
requirements and safety analysis 
processes. A positive spirit of 
cooperation is allowing the 
development of compatibility in
All of the effort to date within 
the NASA portion of the SSF program 
in standardizing the analysis 
methodology and the timing of the 
application has been shared with 
the International Partners. This 
is also true of the studies of the 
QRA, together with the criteria for 
its application.
Each of the three partners have 
likewise shared their proposed 
safety analyses methodologies with 
the other International Partners. 
We all recognize that control of 
hazards and their possible effects 
requires analysis efforts which 
cross the international interfaces. 
We can be sure that the hazard and 
the effects will not feel 
constrained by the international 
interfaces; therefore, we must 
insure that the analysis is not so 
constrained.
What has been outlined above is the 
first step in achieving this treaty 
requirement; that of developing 
good analysis requirements, and 
insuring, by exchange of process 
information, that the similar (if 
not identical) processes will 
produce equivalent results.
Further, the community of the NASA 
and the three International 
Partners, working through the 
exchange described above, are 
adopting data form and formats as 
similar as our differing systems 
will allow. As the ESA safety 
manager says: "That is not a 
requirement, but it certainly makes 
our job easier".
As the safety design requirements 
and the analysis process methods,
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be they identical or similar, they 
must be documented in the Joint 
PDRD, which Is a joint requirements 
document between each International 
Partner and the NASA. This 
document, too, is under 
configuration control by both 
partners.
Once the analysis tools and the 
basic set of safety requirements 
are agreed to and implemented, the 
safety data flow between the 
international partners and the NASA 
must be unimpeded. The electronic 
data bases of the partners must be 
compatible with that of the NASA 
THIS. While we must remain mindful 
of the U.S. Dept of State 
requirement to oversee Technology 
Transfer, we MUST achieve 
unrestricted flow of the safety 
data to a) understand the hazards, 
and b) mitigate the hazards or the 
effects. The system described above 
will insure the daily hazards data 
interchange.
At major milestone reviews through 
the Critical Design Review (CDR), 
and then more often, the integrated 
safety assessment must be 
documented and reviewed by the 
safety community and then with 
program management.
That is not to say that a given 
issue must wait for the periodic 
review; a specific issue must be 
worked in its turn, and taken to 
program management with the 
engineering request for 
requirements change, deviation, or 
waiver; and the associated safety 
risk acceptance of residual risk.
Safety engi neeri ng 
accept the safety 
program; that risk, 
germane program 
schedule, and cost 
given to the program 
decisions on safety
can no longer
risk for the
along with the
performance,
data, must be
management for
risk reduction
or acceptance.
During the periodic reviews which 
document and review the safety risk 
model, a board, composed of all 
affected agencies, must review the 
risk elements and jointly recommend 
disposition to management. This is 
the only manner in which we can 
insure that the risk is truly 
understood.
At these periodic safety risk 
reviews, one parameter to be 
studied is the consistency of the 
safety data. The job jointly 
belongs to the safety community to 
insure that the thoroughness of the 
analyses is maintained, as we are 
all affected bv the outcomes.
The additional check on the 
compliance with the agreed to 
design and analysis requirements is 
a process for "audit", or "survey" 
of the system to assess compliance. 
Any deviation or non-compliance 
must be identified and rectified.
Within the NASA, there are 
established processes for audits. 
The process details of how this 
activity can be accomplished across 
the interface and into the 
International partners' program 
have not been defined and agreed to 
as yet.
SUMMARY
Space Station Freedom is the 
largest international space 
endeavor undertaken since the 
beginning of space exploration. 
Building a diverse, distinctive and 
international Safety Program and 
Safety Community on the Space 
Station Freedom Program will be 
challenging. Within the safety 
community, the individual 
dedication is allowing the 
accomplishment of required goals 
and objectives.
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Concurrently, painstaking 
examination to detail and careful 
documentation of the Space Station 
Freedom requirements are being 
implemented and are mandatory for 
success.
Communication in the safety program 
will utilize state-of-the-art 
software and computers, which will 
provide broad accessibility to 
safety information among the NASA 
and the International Partners. 
Safety information flow will be a 
key tool for integrating and 
achieving a safely designed Space 
Station Freedom and disseminating 
integrated safety assessment 
results.
There have been joint NASA projects 
with other nations, but the Space 
Station Freedom Program brings a 
new level of complexity and 
challenge for successful 
integration of the United States, 
Canada, Japan and the European 
Space Agency. This integration to 
ensure Space Station Freedom 
success will assuredly advance the 
science of safety engineering, 
human engineering and quantitative 
risk assessment in space.
7-50
